There is a
long-standing debate in Belgium over the choice
of flight routes around the national airport located northeast of the capital,
Brussels. A plan last year that reorganized departure routes, routing the
majority over densely populate areas of the capital, was met with strong protest from Brussels residents who now had
to endure noise nuisance they didn’t have under the previous routes. Noise
nuisance from airplanes is, according to recent studies, linked to an important increased risk (10-20% higher
likelihood) of stroke, coronary heart disease, cardiovascular diseases, and
death. Assuming 1) that there is an unavoidable amount of flights above
populated areas and 2) that it is impossible to fully deaden the noises thereby
engendered, what would constitute a just
distribution of flight routes? In other words, what is a just distribution of suffering and risks
caused by plane nuisance? In this post we present three possible answers
and defend one of them.
1.
Fair distribution of costs and
benefits through the market
One answer to
the question is to say that the market already fairly allocates the benefits
and burdens associated with living under established flight routes. Rents and
property prices reflect the distribution of preferences that people have when
it comes to the trade-off between noise pollution and money. This approach would
favour policies that maintain the status quo and reject introducing any changes
in flight routes given that choices were made and expectations were built
around a stability of flight routes. We see two problems with this approach.
Firstly, we do not think that the choices made by some individuals to live
under the flight routes are genuine choices that reflect their preferences. On
the one hand, information about the health costs of airplane nuisance was not
available till recently (2013). On the other hand, there is the worry that many
individuals have no option but to take up residence under flight routes thereby
sacrificing or risking their health not because of a preference for money but
because properties in those areas are the only ones they can afford. Secondly,
even if we were to be certain that choices of all individuals were genuine or
to disregard
voluntariness, a
problem remains with regards to the consequences those choices have on third
parties, in this case the children of those who opt for health risks in
exchange for cheaper rent.
2.
Minimization of total suffering
A second
answer says a just distribution is one that minimizes total suffering. The
argument that flight routes should be organized such that airplane nuisance
affects the least number of people is popular and intuitive. It favours policies that concentrate flights over the least
populated areas. This approach relies on utilitarian reasoning, and although
electorally attractive, it suffers from the classical objection to
utilitarianism: it sacrifices the welfare of part of the population for the
aggregate welfare.
One could
argue, however, that offering compensation to the victims (those who live under
the flight routes) can address this objection. By compensating the victims we
show concern for their suffering and balance out the loss in wellbeing incurred
by the noise pollution. The compensation can take the form of an offer for
relocation or monetary compensation. Yet, we think this response suffers from
the same problems as the first answer which relies on compensation through the
market. The worry is that some might opt for monetary compensation and hence
nuisance and health risks because they are economically disadvantaged and that
their choice at any rate unfairly impacts their children. We recognize that forced
relocations could be one way to counter this worry. Nevertheless, we think it
is problematic as it imposes the burdens of relocation on only part of the
population making it open once more to the initial objection of sacrificing the
welfare of some for the aggregate welfare.
3.
Equalizing suffering and risk
The answer
we favour to the question of just distribution of nuisance and health risks is
one that advocates an equal sharing of the burden because it considers it
unjust to ask some to endure suffering or risk their health for the aggregate
welfare. The policy favoured by this approach would be maximal dispersion of
flights. Of course, maximal dispersion is only a proxy for equal distribution
of burdens for there will be inevitable inequalities. Equalizing risk is
impossible; those living close to the airport will be more affected than those
living farther. Maximal dispersion can be complemented by forced relocation
(for those areas where the risk is highest) and compensation (although the same
concerns about compensation above apply)
The principle of equalizing suffering and risk might strike many as counterintuitive. Don't we by maximal dispoersion simply subject a higher number of people to nuisance and risk than would have been the case under concentration policies? We stand by this principle, however, because we think it is the only one that treats everyone as equal and expresses equal concern/respect to each. Unlike the utilitarian argument, it can be justifiable to each individual. And, we think that justifiability to all trumps efficiency considerations.
That said, we note that a utilitarian appraoch might also support a policy of dispersion if we take into consideration the following two reasons. First, the negative impact of noise pollution is non-linear (the nuisance of two planes is higher than twice the nuisance of one). This means that concentration does not necessarily minimize aggregate suffering. Second, a policy of maximal dispersion might be highly effective in making a substantial number of citizens aware of the nuisance and dangers of airplane noise which could ultimately lead to more effective lobbying to reduce air traddic and find radical alternative solutions.
The principle of equalizing suffering and risk might strike many as counterintuitive. Don't we by maximal dispoersion simply subject a higher number of people to nuisance and risk than would have been the case under concentration policies? We stand by this principle, however, because we think it is the only one that treats everyone as equal and expresses equal concern/respect to each. Unlike the utilitarian argument, it can be justifiable to each individual. And, we think that justifiability to all trumps efficiency considerations.
That said, we note that a utilitarian appraoch might also support a policy of dispersion if we take into consideration the following two reasons. First, the negative impact of noise pollution is non-linear (the nuisance of two planes is higher than twice the nuisance of one). This means that concentration does not necessarily minimize aggregate suffering. Second, a policy of maximal dispersion might be highly effective in making a substantial number of citizens aware of the nuisance and dangers of airplane noise which could ultimately lead to more effective lobbying to reduce air traddic and find radical alternative solutions.
Siba Harb and Pierre Etienne Vandamme
